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 ABSTRACT 
 
Foundations are unique among organizations in the enormous latitude they have in determining 
their work and the manner in which it is done.  This flexibility manifests itself particularly in the 
variety of roles that foundation board members can take.  Most of the literature in the field 
focuses on best practices in board structure and processes.  These are necessary in the spirit of 
responsiveness and legal accountability, but are not sufficient for effectiveness.  Achieving role 
clarity, influence in decision-making and responsibility for impact are three keys to more 
effective foundation governance.  These three attributes can be better understood and achieved 
by examining the roles of foundation board members as individuals and as a collective.  
Recognizing these important, often overlooked, phenomena will help boards not only have good 
work that will keep them enthused and committed, but also to produce the good work that the 
public expects.     
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Effective Foundation Boards 
The Importance of Roles 
by 
 Christine W. Letts  
 
Introduction – The Importance of Roles in Effective Governance  
 
Unlike boards of corporations or typical social service nonprofit organizations, most foundation 
boards are as unrestricted in their flexibility as they are unfettered by accountability.  This makes 
foundations unique among organizations in the enormous latitude they have in determining their 
work and the manner in which it is done. One foundation president summed up the distinct 
nature of foundations as organizations that have “few measures and few imperatives.” If we want 
to create more effective foundations, we need to grapple more directly with the implications of 
this flexibility.  This flexibility manifests itself particularly in the variety of roles that foundation 
board members can take.  
 
First, flexibility affects accountability.  Foundations come into existence when individuals set 
aside an amount of wealth for charitable purposes.  Particularly in the U.S., foundations are 
frequently endowed in perpetuity.  Trusteeship begins with fulfilling the wishes of the 
benefactor.  This means that foundation board members do not have to pass the accountability 
test presented either to trustees of a nonprofit or of a corporation.  The former must continue to 
raise funds to stay in existence.  The latter must assure that both customers and shareholders are 
well served.  Because of the nature of foundation work, providing money or services (in the case 
of operating foundations) to eager supplicants, they operate in an environment that suppresses 
feedback. On the one hand, nothing is easier than running a foundation. On the other hand, 
nothing is harder. It is like trying to play tennis without a net or foul lines.  
 
Second, flexibility affects organizational design.  One of the few requirements imposed on all 
foundations is that they must have a board. Not only is it the ultimate authority for decision-
making in the foundation, the board may be the only authority.  A foundation board either has 
total freedom to establish the mission and activities of the foundation or wide latitude in 
interpreting a trust or mission left by the founder.  Trustees also have the freedom to establish the 
 2
structure of the entity, including whether to have staff or not. The boards of foundations are 
likely to be far more influential over the day-to-day operations of a foundation throughout its 
lifespan than the boards of other types of organizations. Board roles and behavior are affected in 
predictable and important ways by the different structures and types of foundations.  Role 
differences are most pronounced in three types of foundations:   
1. Those in which boards do all of the work  
2. Those in which decision-making is divided between board and staff and  
3. Those in which the benefactor, in a private foundation, or a CEO, in a corporate 
foundation, are active and on the board.      
 
After studying and working with dozens of foundations over the past 4 years, I have become 
convinced that we have been searching for better governance solutions in the wrong places. Most 
of the literature in the field focuses on best practices in board structure and processes.1 Attention 
to compliance with laws, industry standards and fiduciary duties will continue to intensify given 
the most recent media and political attention to abuses by foundation leaders and trustees.2  The 
field has worked to develop guidelines for the operation of foundations and their governance, the 
most notable (and controversial) being the principles established by the Council on Foundations 
as requirements for membership. As recently as January 2004, the noted philanthropic 
consultant, Peter Karoff, suggests that foundations undertake customer feedback, peer review 
and standards in order to regain public trust.3  These guidelines are important, but conversations 
with foundation CEOs and trustees over the last four years indicate to me that they are necessary 
in the spirit of responsiveness and accountability, but not sufficient for effectiveness. 4    
 
This “best practice” approach falls short because it does not take into account the “flexibility 
factor” that challenges foundations.  The actual experience of hundreds of foundations tells us 
that a wide variety of structures and processes can be made to work.  Moreover, the prescriptions 
about structure and processes fail to address the real problems experienced by sitting boards. 
                                                 
1 Appendix II 
2 See Fremont-Smith, Marion, “Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and 
Regulation”(Belknap Press Copyright 2004)  
3 Karoff, Peter, “On the Issue of Trust,” The Philanthropic Initiative, January 2004.  
4 Many of the quotes and examples in this paper come from the Executive Session on the Future of Philanthropy 
convened by The Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations, Harvard University from 1999-2002 and the 
International Network in Strategic Philanthropy sponsored by the Bertelsmann Foundation from 2002-2004.   
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In this paper, I will argue that some of the most chronic problems experienced by foundation 
boards could be addressed if there were greater clarity about the roles that the board can play. In 
other kinds of organizations, board roles are both well defined and well-aligned with structure 
and processes.5 This is not the case for foundations. Because foundations have far more latitude 
in how they define and do their work, the role of the Board and of individual board members is 
far more problematic. Yet it is a problem we have largely overlooked.    
 
In making a case for focus on roles, I am not minimizing the significant challenge foundations 
have in meeting public expectations – either those explicitly mandated by law or those implicitly 
set by societal norms.  The first obligation of any board of trustees is to know the law and 
establish compliance with it.  In fact, the legal context in which a foundation operates is likely to 
establish roles, or put limits of some kind on them, for foundation trustees.   Nothing in this 
paper is intended to replace, obscure or undermine this basic responsibility.  
   
Moving Toward Greater Board Effectiveness  
 
When foundation CEOs and board members describe their problems, they fall naturally into 
three categories.   
Lack of clarity.  A common problem is lack of clarity about the roles of board members that 
includes, if there is staff, lack of clarity about the division of decision-making.  There are six 
major areas for decision-making for a grantmaking foundation:  establishing the mission; 
developing programmatic strategy; establishing the organizational structure and culture; 
determining grantmaking strategy; determining the guidelines for grantee relationships; and 
evaluation.   Achieving clarity about the role of the board as a collective or the roles of 
individuals has two components.  The first is the ability to articulate the intended role or roles for 
each foundation board member and the group as a whole.  The second component is assuring that 
these roles are aligned with expectations of the board members and with staff, if there is one.  
1. Lack of influence.  Even when tasks are consistent with expectations, it may turn out that 
the board members do not feel as though the work is important, or that they have any 
                                                 
5 Just because there is clarity, it does not mean effectiveness.  For a full discussion of the problems of boards of 
conventional nonprofits, see Governance as Leadership by Richard Chait, William Ryan and Barbara Taylor, 
BoardSource, forthcoming, 2004.   
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significant influence over decisions that matter.  Therefore, in addition to clarity, the 
second condition we want to achieve within the board is influence.  When either of these 
two conditions is absent, we would typically find a situation in which one or more of the 
stakeholders are dissatisfied.  This is true for board members in foundations without staff, 
or for board and staff alike in staffed foundations.  
2. Responsibility for impact.  While the first two conditions set a minimum standard for 
“functioning,” in that board and staff are happy with the situation, they do not address 
whether anything of worth is being accomplished.  Many foundation leaders agree that 
boards have accountability for two dimensions of performance: to do the right thing and 
to do it well.  Doing the right thing may mean meeting social needs, usually articulated in 
the mission (value determined by the outside) or adhering to donor intent (value 
determined on the inside), or as is frequently the case, both. 6  The actual question to ask 
is whether the board is contributing to effectiveness. 
 
I offer two questions that can help a foundation board begin to diagnose its effectiveness:  
 
· Is this board functioning to everyone’s satisfaction?   This question will help the board 
identify issues relating to clarity and influence.   
· Is the board operating in a way to enable the foundation to maximize its impact?  This 
question helps the board understand its role and responsibility in assuring that the 
foundation is creating value, and not simply following guidelines associated with its 
activities or output.   
 
Achieving clarity, influence and responsibility are three keys to more effective foundation 
governance.  They can be better understood and addressed by examining the roles of foundation 
board members as individuals and collectively. In the following sections, I will identify the roles 
that foundation board members occupy and discuss the problems that can accompany them.  
Recognizing these important, but unappreciated phenomena will help boards not only have good 
work that will keep them enthused and committed, but also to produce the good works that the 
                                                 
6 Letts, Christine, “Foundation Boards:  Value, Cost and Questions,” unpublished paper, February 2002. 
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public expects.   Appendix I contains a more complete set of questions to help foundation boards 
achieve satisfaction and effectiveness.    
 
The Question of Accountability to the Public  
Are foundations accountable for their activities to the public?  This is an issue that is fairly hotly debated among 
foundation trustees and executives.  Some claim that foundations, by virtue of being publicly authorized by tax 
codes or regulation, and legally bound to provide “public good,” must be accountable, in a transparent way, for their 
activities to the public.  Others argue that private foundations carry no such burden, as long as they are obeying the 
law.  Some private foundation trustees will cite that they are only accountable to fulfill the conditions of a founder’s 
trust or will.  Executives of foundations where there is still a living donor will cite that they are accountable to the 
wishes of the donor.  There has been no legal interpretation that holds foundations accountable to the public for 
more than the legal requirements, using the definition “having to report, explain or justify” for accountability. 
 
However, I do think that foundations hold certain ethical obligations, and even where they are not legally 
accountable, we should hold them responsible for certain acts or behaviors.  Acting ethically means using principles 
to make judgments and decisions.  For example, the moral responsibility to “do no harm” is one with which hardly 
any foundation would disagree, yet many foundation boards have no procedures or processes to assure themselves 
that in fact they are not causing harm (in the level of cost, for example) to grantees or the public.  There is no 
requirement that a foundation proclaim publicly about the impact and effectiveness of its programs, but if it does, it 
should tell the truth and be able to defend its claims.  This paper offers foundation trustees a set of questions that 
provide a minimum level of self-examination and assessment and that set the basis for principles on which to 
operate.   
 
Achieving Clarity and Influence  
 
The first challenge is to establish the role of the board as a collective, the roles of individuals on 
the board, and the division of decision-making.   The greatest challenge here is not finding the 
“one right answer” but making sure that the roles are aligned with the expectations of 
prospective members.   
 
Board members will want to know how they can be important to the foundation.  There are a 
couple of principles that will help board members contribute value.  First, minimize the 
transactional work where neither staff nor board members feel valuable.  Spending time does not 
substitute for influence.  Board members will be willing to put up with some redundant or 
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perfunctory work that may be necessary, if they have other opportunities to channel their interest 
or expertise.  Second, board members should be encouraged to focus their time and energy 
committed to the foundation.  They may focus on a part of the grant making process, such as 
helping to do site visits, or they may focus on a subject area, such as the arts, in which the 
foundation does work.  In each of these examples, a board member will become valuable by 
virtue of his time contribution and the knowledge that he will build about the work of the 
foundation.  Rotating responsibilities from time to time will avoid some of the pitfalls associated 
with ownership or power-grabbing.  Unfortunately, identifying the roles where individuals really 
add value is easier said than done. 
 
The Evolution of Boards  
Roles on foundation boards are not static.  Roles may change as strategy and size change, but the most profound 
changes may happen from a foundation’s inception through the years as it “institutionalizes.”  The roles and 
behavior of members of a founding board, who may have had close association with the original donor, will be very 
different than those of trustees brought on years later for their legitimacy or expertise in a substantive area.  A 
founding foundation CEO observed the following about this evolution, “There is an interesting transition period 
when a new foundation is set up and the board/donor dominate, and when the foundation becomes more 
conventional with the staff making most of the decisions and the board sets policy.  Getting from A to C is not that 
easy.  We had a few board members who really helped with that process, and then weren’t entirely overjoyed when 
the staff didn’t always do their bidding anymore!”  Thus, the questions that make sense in framing the roles and 
responsibilities for foundation boards remain relevant throughout a foundation’s lifespan and need to be asked 
regularly.   
 
A pivotal question:  Are board members informed givers or institutional trustees?   
 
Clearly one of the appeals of foundation board work is the opportunity to be generous – to give 
away money.  Self-dealing episodes aside, this spirit of altruism is not bad.  It drives the 
commitment with which most foundation board members tackle their assignment.  For board 
members in foundations with no staff, they have the opportunity to be givers as well as trustees.  
Many staffed foundations turn to the corporate model for their governance design.  As 
institutional trustees, they establish or interpret the mission, approve strategies and assure that 
grant making programs are consistent with the mission and strategy.   However, the psychology 
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of generosity tends to put boards in a peculiar position: they want to be involved in all of the 
work, rather than maintain the distance of institutional trustees  
 
Lack of clarity about these two fundamental roles is the source of much of the tension for staff 
and boards alike.  One foundation executive said, “It seems to me that it’s going to be hard for 
this sector, for all of us, to have the highest impact that we could have with such ambiguity and 
uncertainty about how the board, the CEO and the staff all relate to each other.”  One consultant 
to foundations likened this ambiguity to an “invisible contract.”7  Somehow responsibilities are 
divided up, and sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t.  At worst, there is an ongoing tug 
of war, with the board and staff spending a lot of time and psychic energy jockeying for position.  
A large well-known family foundation in New York spent ten years in this condition after the 
family board hired its first (and current) CEO and program staff.  Over the years, the board has 
moved in and out of each of the aforementioned six decision-making arenas, creating a set of 
misaligned policies that have certainly caused dissatisfaction and may have constrained the 
organization’s ability to have impact. 
 
 
 
 
The Informed Giver Role 
 
Boards as Staff 
 
For foundations with little or no staff, which represents 94% of the total foundations in the U.S.8, 
it is clear that the board does the work, however it is defined.  Without staff, the work will 
normally be restricted to grantmaking, since operating foundations need staff to run activities.  
The board likely has a lot of latitude in how it does its work, from deciding whether to take 
proposals to how to divide the work among the members.  Although the roles themselves are 
likely to be fairly clear, the problem may be that the way the work is defined may be neither 
efficient nor effective. 
                                                 
7 Tom Tierney, Chairman, Bridgespangroup.  
8 Staffed foundations represent 58.2% of foundation assets.  62.7% of staffed foundations report only 1-2 staff. 
Foundation Today Series 2003 Edition “Foundation Staffing; Foundation Center. 
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  The work of the board may be divided horizontally or vertically.  In the horizontal version, the 
work is assigned by function, such as intake, review, and site visits, with each board member 
participating in a part of the process to get the grant recommendations to the board.  The whole 
board then makes final decisions on grants.  In the vertical version, each board member performs 
all functions for a program area of grants.  Final approval by the entire board is essentially 
perfunctory, as each board member accepts the others’ recommendations.   
 
When board members play the informed giver role, the good news is that it allows them to feel 
good about making altruistic decisions and act as appropriate stewards of the public trust at the 
same time.  They can fully enjoy the expressive benefit of trusteeship as well as the 
instrumental.9  This means that they can fulfill their own personal philanthropic aspirations or 
vision, and thus have personal satisfaction, and they have role in creating public value, and have 
thus fulfilled their institutional responsibility.    
 
However, problems arise when roles are defined that do not achieve an appropriate balance 
between these two ideals.  Here are four symptoms that the board should be on the lookout for:    
 
1. Mission drift.  When the work is divided vertically, with each board member managing 
his or her own portfolio from start to finish, it is difficult for the foundation to maintain a 
clear and coherent mission.  In foundations with very broad missions, where this may not 
result in a significant departure from the legal mandate, it may lead to a confusing or 
capricious character.  As each board member defers to the others judgment without 
scrutiny or question, legal oversight responsibility assigned to all members may be 
shirked.  The foundation may drift into a collection of individually motivated charities, 
without regard to strategy or impact.   
 
2. Unfulfilling  work.  I met a board member at a conference who complained about his role 
in the family foundation.  The board had divided up the work among the members to 
“keep all of them involved” but this had unintended consequences.  This nephew’s 
                                                 
9 For a full discussion of the expressive and instrumental motivation in nonprofits, see Frumkin, Peter, On Being 
Nonprofit, Harvard University Press, 2003.   
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responsibility was to open proposals and do a first screening for those that clearly did not 
meet the foundations guidelines.  While this work was essential, and influential, it was 
drudgery.  He had to wade through lots of paperwork and had the privilege of saying 
“no” to hundreds of proposals.  He preferred not to be involved in the foundation at all 
rather than have this job.  
 
3. More work than expected.  Most people consider serving on a foundation board to be an 
honor and a pleasure, and individuals will usually calculate that the work is worthy of 
some level of time.  Without staff, however, the work can expand beyond what many 
would consider appropriate volunteer time.  Even if the trustees are compensated, the rate 
may not justify the amount of work.  A recent survey in the U.S. found that more than 
two-thirds of the foundations surveyed pay fees to their trustees.10  However, there has 
been no study that compares the level of compensation to the work.  The hazard of too 
much work is that the work may be compressed to fit the time, which results in less-
informed grantmaking.  Moreover, the pool of people willing to serve as trustees may 
shrink, jeopardizing the quality of decision-making.  The Society for Good and 
Charitable, known as GGG, is a foundation that has been operating in Basel, Switzerland 
since 1778.  A religious-based association (not technically a foundation under Swiss law) 
it has been operating under the dictum, “the rich do not go to heaven.”  It provides about 
5 million Swiss francs in grants per year.  There are seven trustees that perform all the 
work with the aid of two secretaries.  The presidency rotates each year among the seven.  
Each trustee is in charge of one of seven thematic areas, such as children, elderly, music, 
art, and they keep each for seven years.  The entire board approves all the grants and 
reviews all denials in meetings held every two weeks.  One estimate is that the trustees 
spend up to 20% of their time on foundation work, and they are not compensated.  While 
past generations have been satisfied with this arrangement, some younger working men 
and women find it difficult to spend this amount of time uncompensated.  
 
                                                 
10 Ahn, Christine, Eisenberg, Pablo, Khamvongsa, Channapha, “Foundation Trustee Fees: Use and Abuse,” 
Georgetown Public Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. 2003.  
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4. Insularity and shirking institutional trusteeship.  In foundations without staff, the 
mundane work that we all associate with the institutional trustee role, such as paying 
attention to industry standards or norms, may take a backseat to the board’s full plate of 
grantmaking responsibilities.  For example, there are few laws and few legal precedents 
that help foundation trustees set compensation for themselves.  Only the most egregious 
examples of greed are challenged legally, such as the Bishop Estate in Hawaii, in which 
the directors received $1 million per year.   Challenges are more likely to come from the 
media that arouse some sense of public outrage when it looks like trustees have burst 
through some hazy boundary of selfishness.  In June 2003 The Buffalo News ran an 
article spotlighting the compensation of the three trustees of the Oishi Foundation in 
Buffalo, New York, each of whom makes $127,000.11   It turns out that the 
compensation, which is a percent of assets, is specified in the foundation trust. While the 
Council on Foundations discourages this policy, the foundation trustees still feel that the 
compensation is not excessive for the amount of work they perform with no staff.  With 
little accountability for results and virtually no oversight, compensated foundation 
trustees are likely to be targets for occasional scrutiny. 12   Having staff does not guarantee 
that this will not happen, but staff is likely to be more tuned in to industry norms.  
Excessive private benefit is an example of where trustees abdicate all of their 
responsibility as institutional trustees.   
 
The Informed Giver Role in Family Foundation Boards    
 
In many foundations, the original donor is part of the decision-making.  This may be the 
patriarch or matriarch of a family, a wealthy self-made individual or someone who has inherited 
wealth.  If the individual sets up a foundation through which to do his philanthropy, he may be 
required to have a board, or may want one.  Frequently one of the first impulses of a principal is 
to make philanthropy a family affair.  The patriarch may intend for the foundation to be a family 
                                                 
11 Tokasz, Jay, “Givers Under Scrutiny: Charitable Foundations Nationally Gave Nearly $30 Billion in 2002, But 
some in Congress Think They Could Give More, If Less Were Spent on Salaries and Trustee Fees,” The Buffalo 
News, July 11, 2003, A1. 
12 The Boston Globe investigative reporters found one trustee who paid himself several hundred thousand dollars 
extra in one year to afford an expensive wedding for his daughter.  Healy, Beth et al., “Some Officers of Charities 
Steer Assets to Selves”, Boston Globe, October 9, 2003, A1. 
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legacy, to preserve and protect the family’s place in the community.  He may want to establish a 
place and activity where the family works together.  He may want to train successive generations 
to be mindful of the community and learn how to give appropriately.  Family boards may at once 
be the most natural and unnatural bodies.  Like royalty, family members arrive on the board 
because of birth, not because they know anything about philanthropy, the cause, or the 
community.  Their existing relationships may bring great advantage to the workings of the board, 
but just as easily they may bring great dysfunction.  
 
A pivotal question:  Is the board role in a family foundation an obligation or an opportunity? 
 
Whether the role is an obligation or an opportunity begins to shape all expectations and 
interactions.  There is a big difference between asking children to be trustees of a parent’s legacy 
and giving them the opportunity to become philanthropists.  Either one of these can be fine, but 
clarity about this is important.  In this way then, the funder’s intentions need to be aligned with 
the structure and processes developed for the board.   
 
Consider Joe Jacobs, an engineer who became wealthy through his company.  He created a 
foundation in San Diego and asked his three daughters to be on the board.  He said that every 
person had an equal vote.  His daughters called his intention into question when he insisted that 
the foundation make a grant to a conservative think tank. They objected.  He ended up backing 
down, and renewed his commitment to the foundation as a place for the family to make decisions 
together, where all the voices matter.  Each member could give to causes not adopted by the 
whole group out of their private wealth.  This clarification turned out to be healthy and 
productive for the family and the foundation.13  
 
Frequently, no matter what the principal or charter says, the family reverts into long-standing, 
predictable roles with each other.  Despite the best intentions of a patriarch or matriarch, family 
foundation boards rarely provide a space for family togetherness and harmony if those conditions 
                                                 
13 For more on the Jacobs Family Foundation, see “The Jacobs Family Foundation,” Kennedy School of 
Government Case Program, forthcoming 2004. 
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do not already exist.  Negative family dynamics are just as likely to appear and disrupt the 
smooth functioning of a foundation board as they are a holiday dinner.  
 
Board dynamics will inevitably change as family circumstances change. Family members marry, 
divorce, have children, move away, and pass away.  There are many reasons that roles, 
responsibilities and relationships evolve, so it is important to structure processes to allow family 
boards to adapt.  The staff executive of a large, well-known family foundation in New York City 
reminds us of this by remarking that in a family, the “deals are never done.”   
 
A Special Distinction: The Advisor Role  
 
After family, the principal of a foundation will bring outside people onto the board in the role of 
advisors.  Family boards frequently benefit from outsiders who can serve to mediate or mitigate 
family conflict, which is why someone who already has a relationship with the family can be 
valuable.  These people are trusted friends or colleagues, and may be lawyers or investment 
advisors.  The nature of the relationship usually sets the expectations about role; in that they 
understand that they are there as an aide to the principal decision-maker, rather than as an 
institutional trustee, although they may carry the latter role legally.  For example, A wealthy 
businessman from Texas, Bob Buford, started a foundation and organized a board of “smart 
people who help him think.”  
 
Board roles in corporate foundations may be similar to those in private foundations with a living 
donor because of the presence of the top executive to whom other executives or outsiders look 
for final decisions.  The executive will usually wield informal leadership if not formal leadership 
as a board chair.  So a normal role of members on a corporate foundation board is to assist the 
top executives in decision-making as advisors or experts, similar to the roles described above.  In 
many regions, such as Latin America, corporate foundations may be tantamount to family 
foundations because the company is family held.   
 
Advisor role confusion can result in several ways.  First, the principal decision-maker may not 
clarify roles at the beginning.  Some people who are brought on a foundation board may assume 
that they are advisors, whose opinions become input for the primary decision-maker, but others 
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may assume that their power, voice and vote are equal to others. Legally each board member has 
equal responsibility, but that does not mean that the principal intends for the decision-making to 
operate that way.  Role confusion can also result when circumstances change, and board roles do 
not keep up with the evolution of the decision-makers’ interests.  Finally, confusion will result 
when behaviors are not consistent with stated intentions, as in the case of the Jacobs Family 
foundation mentioned above.   
 
Where there is money, there is always the possibility of power plays.  Some board members may 
in fact have more influence over the principal than others.  In some cases, rivalries and jealousies 
may result over the perceptions of unequal influence.  In a few cases, there may be explicit 
moves to change the power balance such as voting certain people off the board or adding allies 
who can outvote certain members.     
 
The role of advisors, like informed givers, can also lead to imbalance.  While advisors probably 
have satisfying influence, the danger is they may fall short in their institutional responsibilities.  
Early clarity about this is important, particularly where close friends or colleagues are involved.  
A range of choices about these arrangements is possible.  Keeping advisors just that, and not 
making them board members, is one option, so that their advisory role and decision-making 
responsibility are not confused.  It is also possible to establish procedures that separate 
deliberation about grants from actual approvals, such as giving an executive committee exclusive 
rights to grant approvals.    
 
Summary.  Achieving a balance between informed giving and institutional trusteeship begins 
with acknowledging the legitimacy of both roles.  The key to thwarting the negative behaviors 
we often attribute to board members who are too attached to giving may be to pay more attention 
to the roles that allow for the many more ways in which trustees can have influence in the work.   
 
The Institutional Trustee Role 
 
Once boards hire staff, the challenge is to define the roles of the board and to divide the decision-
making between the board and staff to allow sufficient influence for the board and clarity for the 
staff.   There is a fairly standard model of division of responsibilities in corporate and nonprofit 
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boards.  The boards “govern” or set policy and remain at the mission and strategy end of the 
spectrum.  Their responsibilities may or may not include evaluation.  The tasks of these boards 
are therefore often described as “pre- and post-operations.”  
 
Foundation boards do not adhere to this standard model.  As mentioned earlier, foundation 
boards have flexibility in assigning themselves decision-making responsibility in all six of the 
arenas (mission, strategy, structure, grantmaking, relationships, evaluation).  Just because there is 
a staff, trustees do not necessarily give up their informed giver role. As the foundation world has 
become increasingly professionalized, foundation boards and staff have become more 
sophisticated in their decision-making, and manage to avoid the problems associated with total 
lack of clarity about the division of responsibilities.  However, ma ny have not yet learned to 
avoid the pitfalls associated with the three common ways in which roles are divided: co-
producers, grants approvers and policy-makers.  
 
The Co-Producer Role  
 
Boards of staffed foundations can actually share the work with the staff. A New England family, 
active in the ownership and management of a privately held company, operated their foundation 
in its early years without staff.  They asked close associates to help identify individuals with 
significant relevant expertise in the family’s philanthropic interests to join them on the board.  
The board then did all the work with part-time assistance for several years.  When they 
eventually recruited full-time professional staff, instead of relinquishing all work other than 
policy setting, they shared the work with the staff.  Board members participate in analysis, 
planning, engaging with grantees and monitoring of grant strategies.  Here is the key: since this 
arrangement was the expectation from the beginning, it has become a comfortable and 
productive use of staff and board alike.  This “co-investor” structure is facilitated by the 
foundation concentrating in a few large areas for their grantmaking.  
  
Trainees.  Sometimes inexperienced trustees may be chosen for the board in a trainee role in 
order to prepare them for future service.  Family foundations will frequently use a few trustee 
positions to train younger family members in philanthropy.  One might see emerging executives 
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placed in rotation on corporate foundation boards to acquaint these people with the culture and 
strategies of the corporation’s community involvement.  These trustees-in-training may end up 
with duties that involve them more in the work of the foundation as a learning experience.        
 
Experts.   It is normal and advantageous to invite program area experts to serve on a foundation 
board.  They may be frequently engaged with staff outside of regular board duties in the design, 
execution or evaluation of programs.  It is not hard to imagine the pitfalls of board members who 
may be expert enough, or even more expert than staff, to make decisions on their own.  
Confusion, and perhaps contention, arises when it is not clear whether the expert is there to 
advise the board with enough information to help the group make a decision, to advise, or even 
oversee staff, or whether she is there to be the primary decision-maker.  The original purpose 
might have been the advisor role, but groups can quickly fall into patterns of behavior, frequently 
just out of deference, where members give the final decision over to the expert.  This may be one 
of the few examples of too much influence in too small a sphere.  Adele Simmons, the former 
CEO of the MacArthur Foundation, provides this observation after working for years with the 
selection process for the MacArthur “genius” awards:  “In areas where there is room for a great 
deal of subjectivity, such as poetry and music, the personal preferences of experts on the 
committee would have an influence, and candidates would have difficulty, or success, in part 
because of these preferences.  This is, to some extent, inevitable, but it balances out over the long 
run, as people on the selection committee have limited terms.  One just has to recognize this and 
watch for it.”   
 
Ms. Simmons also had observations on the evolution of expert roles:  “When (the foundation) 
was developing its programs, we had trustees who were real visionaries – they designed 
programs in the environment, peace and international security and human development – using 
lots of outsiders, regular seminars at the foundation, and usually one key staff person….  We had 
to deal with conflict of interest issues because some of the best work was being done at places 
these board members were associated with.  Early on this was fairly informal, it became formal 
later.  Then the rest of the staff was hired as the programs took shape.  When the specialists died, 
we had more of a generalist board.  This can have a drawback, too, because these people are not 
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as connected to the cutting edge of the field.  In an ideal world, a good board includes people 
with expertise in the areas of interest to the foundation as well as generalists.” 
  
It is very difficult to maintain a distinction of roles when board members are authorized to 
participate in the work of the foundation alongside the staff.  Lack of clarity can result in three 
issues for the foundation.  First, it may be difficult to create a good working relationship and also 
avoid redundancy in what the board and staff do.  The board will rarely have the time and 
flexibility to add distinctive value always when it is needed, thus putting an extra burden on staff.  
Second, the board members may lose their ability to be objective stewards of resources and 
activities the more they are part of creating those activities.  Third, while they may be in a 
position to evaluate staff more closely, they may lose their ability to be objective about the staff 
and programs.  Thus, close attention must be paid to maintaining the proper oversight 
responsibilities.     
For different type grants, boards should be able to take on different roles. 
Most foundations have several areas in which they do grantmaking, and the board as a whole and as individuals may have very different expertise 
and interest related to each of the areas.  William Schambra, former Vice President of the Bradley Foundation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, once 
described the “four faces” of the Bradley Foundation.  These faces are: 1) the largest private foundation in Milwaukee and Wisconsin; 2) the 
philanthropic flagship of the American conservative movement; 3) the chief philanthropic vehicle for the “new citizenship” agenda; and 4) a 
venture fund for moving conservative causes from discovery to public policy.  The board members who are prominent Milwaukee citizens have 
deep and broad networks, and frequently have more information about local issues than the staff.  In the other areas, they will rely on staff to keep 
up with progress and quality of work in existing conservative institutions and to find new ones.  The “national” board members may bring 
expertise in policy areas, but cannot lend advice on specific organizations either locally or nationally. Like the Bradley Foundation, most 
foundations have multiple program areas, but only a single set of processes through which the board and staff interact and make decisions. The 
ability of trustees to provide value will vary among program areas and types of grants, and their ability to influence should be adapted 
accordingly. 
 
The Grants Approver Role 
 
Many foundations maintain a rule, or tradition, of the board approving all grants.  Despite the 
problems cited above associated with boards doing this, it is quite normal and customary for 
boards to retain this responsibility.  It can be done well, which would mean that the activity is 
done with sufficient knowledge and accountability to make it a “real” function and that it does 
not create excessive cost over value for the staff.  
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The problems that can be associated with boards that approve grants are in role confusion or 
cost.  For example, the board of a large, staffed family foundation approves grants rather than set 
policy because policy discussions bring out the deepest ideological divisions among its many 
multi-generational members.  However, the board is not satisfied just to trust staff to present a 
docket for their approval.  The board has developed many committees representing the program 
areas, and the staff is responsible for educating these committees about their program and grant 
making strategies. The challenge is to contain the redundancy and cost that might be associated 
with these processes that otherwise are highly valuable in creating opportunity for influence.   
 
The Merian Foundation in Basel, Switzerland, led by Christian Felber, is an example where grant 
making by the board seems to work well.  This is an old and well-respected foundation. With a 
staff of 70, it has a grant making division and several operating divisions in printing, art, 
agriculture and real estate.  There are seven trustees elected by the “bourgeoisie” of the 
community (the people elect a parliament that elects the board).  Felber estimates that the board 
spends about two-thirds time on philanthropy and one-third on real estate and other operating 
matters.  The board meets once per month for four hours and reviews every grant 
recommendation.  Christian says, “They love grant making.  I have very little discretionary 
money.”  The board is engaged in other ways.  Each year the board goes on a two-day visit to 
another community to learn about programs.  Every other month the staff arranges a site visit to a 
grantee for the board.    Christian believes that the structure works well for what it is designed to 
do and that the board president and other trustees are satisfied as well. He describes the value of 
the decision-making structure as follows: “They control me.  They make me feel responsible.  
I’m not tempted to push my own agenda.”  This board seems to reflect a good balance among 
creating accountability for performance by staff, meaningful engagement and public 
accountability. 
 
The Policy-maker Role 
 
Many staffed foundations define the board’s responsibility at the mission and strategy end of the 
spectrum and turn to the corporate model for their governance design.  The board is to establish 
or interpret the mission, approve strategies and assure that the grantmaking programs are 
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consistent with the mission and strategy.  Evaluation duties may or may not be included in their 
responsibilities.  Much of the existing literature advises processes based on this model.  But in 
many cases, the board does not really set strategy.  It relies on the studies, options and 
recommendations from staff and consultants.  It is clear that they approve strategy.  But how else 
does the board really add value?   Policy-making is important in theory, but potentially limited in 
practice.  Herein lay the opportunities for problems with boards that are in the policy-making 
role.   
 
While grantmaking foundations are the dominant form in the United States, operating 
foundations are the dominant form in Europe and Latin America.  Many foundations do both.  
Foundations that are primarily operating, such as the Bertelsmann Foundation and many other 
foundations in Europe, have boards that are charged with overseeing the management of 
operating entities.  It is misleading to think that operating foundations are easier to govern 
because they resemble corporations and therefore the corporate model of governance can be 
applied.  While there seems to be a clear division of responsibilities in a corporation between 
governance and management, there is neither clarity nor precedent for such a division in 
operating foundations.  Operating foundations are just as likely to have operating trustees as 
governing trustees overseeing a strong and independent management team.  Operating 
foundation boards have to struggle with many of the potential problems that grantmaking 
foundation boards do, and then some.  
  
What are appropriate divisions of responsibility that offer sufficient influence, yet avoid the 
problems cited for informed givers?  A recent project on governance sheds some light on this 
question. Its authors describe two types of board roles at the policy end of the spectrum that add 
value.14 The first is a board that behaves a little like a bumblebee buzzing around the CEO 
encouraging vigilance, lest the CEO get stung by stepping out of line, similar to the way 
Christian Felber described his situation above.  A foundation trustee explained a similar 
phenomenon by describing questioning by the board as useful when it came in the form of 
“ordinary questions about the work that required staff to think about their work in a non-jargon 
way.”   The second role described by Chait, et al. is more passive, but equally valuable.  The 
                                                 
14Chait, et al. op cit. p. 3  
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board creates what the authors call “sense-making opportunities” for the staff.  Simply by 
meeting and maintaining consistent and predictable processes for what may seem like routine 
approvals, the staff has a chance to regularly take stock of what is happening, apply some critical 
thinking and prepare rationale for what they are doing or what should be changed.    
Paul Brest, president of the Hewlett Foundation in California describes such a satisfactory 
arrangement with his board.  Despite having very large assets, Hewlett has a relatively small 
staff because their grantmaking strategy emphasizes longer term relationships, large multi-year 
general support grants that result in fewer grant transactions for the program staff.  Brest reports, 
“The Board does approve individual grants.  Grants used to take up virtually the entire Board 
meeting.  During the past several years, the Board has become engaged in broader issues of 
strategy, reviewing strategic plans proposed for each program by the program directors and 
president, and reviewing proposals to close some existing programs and develop new ones.  Most 
of the programs have Board task forces that assist the program directors in developing and 
reviewing strategies.  Increasingly, I think the most important role the Board plays for me in my 
capacity as president – as distinguished from their important trusteeship and auditing 
responsibilities – is that it provides different and sometimes unexpected perspectives on issues 
that the staff and I have thought through.”  He described his board as focused on their fiduciary 
responsibilities and stewardship of the donor’s intent, trusting him to implement strategies 
competently.  He has found substantial value in being able to call on them individually.  In this 
way, they end up being involved or knowledgeable in different pieces of the work.  The role of 
the board is well understood and aligned with the processes and strategies of the foundations.  
Board members’ level of influence is consistent with their expectations.  
Chait, et al, propose that boards that are in the policy-making arena focus on becoming more 
competent in three modes of work.  They propose moving from fiduciary oversight to inquiry, 
from strategic planning to strategic thinking and to become engaged in “generative” work where 
boards provide a source for leadership. 
 
What are the common problems associated with policy-maker roles?   
 
1. Strategy as straightjacket.  A foundation board that is restricted to the policy end of the 
spectrum may indeed embrace this role and attempt to do it well.  Lucy Hays Nesbeda, 
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granddaughter of Edna McConnell Clark and a trustee for years of the foundation of the 
same name, described a high quality process used there.  The foundation had excellent 
staff with knowledge and experience in their fields.  Experts were brought in from 
academia and practice to advise the staff and board during planning processes.  Board 
members were part of subgroups learning about the program areas in detail.  Five to 
seven year plans were established and staff was held accountable for the goals and 
regular reporting against these plans.  Nesbeda had an interesting observation however.  
She noticed that while in some areas, such as disease research, the long-term plans served 
the program purposes well, in others, such as criminal justice, they did not.   In a social 
policy area the political and economic environment, at the federal, state, or local level, 
could change drastically within a few years time, and make the original assumptions 
underlying the program irrelevant or unrealistic.  At other times, events might create 
opportunities that would require major changes in spending plans that became difficult 
once the staff and board were locked into their plans.  The need for detailed and complex 
justification from staff, and the usual focus on implementation serve to create a situation 
where both staff and board can go on “autopilot” once policy is set.  This situation can 
create excessive ownership among staff of their plans and programs, resulting in 
predictable resistance to change.    
 
2. High cost for questionable value.  Foundation CEOs described one set of problems with 
boards in the policy role as value for investment.  The board demands a huge amount of 
time, but doesn’t seem to create equivalent value, representing alignment failure. The 
following comments reflect this theme:  “To some extent I think I’m running a 
production operation instead of one that’s creative, reflective, and insightful about what 
we ought to be doing.  In the preparation for the board a lot of good work actually gets 
done…I just want all the brain damage to stop.  I know the board doesn’t read all that 
information;” and, “A frustration that I have in general is the inefficiency in the way we 
do our work in foundations and how much time we spend on the form over the substance, 
in the paperwork.  Most of our time is spent on donors and boards, making those 
decisions happen.  I would like to spend more time on the mission, actually working with 
organizations and finding out better ways we can actually work with them.”  
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3. Disengagement/Lack of interest.  Disengagement can result when the board plays only a 
policy-making role with too little meaningful work.  This disengagement can threaten the 
ability of a board to be responsible in its duties.  One CEO described his fears about this, 
“That’s another thing that keeps me awake at night: ‘My God, the board doesn’t have any 
idea what we are doing.’ When they were signing off on grants, they may not have 
understood everything we were doing, but they at least knew where the money was 
going.  Now, obviously, they re getting an awful lot of reporting from us, but given busy 
people and all the rest, I’m not entirely sure that they are really engaged with what we are 
giving them.”  
 
A former program officer of a foundation described another form of disengagement.  The 
board met once a quarter for one hour plus lunch.  The docket was normally 60 grants.  
The staff arranged the docket so that the least controversial grants came first, occupied a 
lot of the time, with the more contentious grants at the end.  The latter grants were 
normally voted through as a block due to lack of time, as the board members heard the 
tinkling of glassware being put in place for lunch.  This board essentially operated as a 
pleasant social obligation.  This may provide value to the participants and may confer 
legitimacy and credibility to the foundation by the prestige of the individuals, but it does 
not provide value to the foundation either in accountability or effectiveness.   
 
Another set of family board members discovered that hiring competent staff to help them 
develop strategy and recommend grants ended up removing them too much from the 
interesting part of philanthropy.15  The third generation group of the New York-based 
Kaplan Foundation decided that they would make grants as a group rather than divide up 
the money for each of them to grant individually.  They hired a well-respected CEO who 
proceeded to develop an excellent grantmaking strategy consistent with the mission that 
the cousins had developed.  After several rounds of grantmaking in this vein, the cousins 
began to lose interest.  The passion and fun of the work was missing for them, so they 
ended up reverting back to doing the grantmaking process on their own.  It is important to 
                                                 
15 Husock, Howard, The Kaplan Family Foundation, KSG Case #1551.0 
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note that neither one of these structures is right or wrong, or good or bad.  For this group, 
staff did not let them have the personal involvement and influence that they wanted.    
 
4. Meddling.  Board members who are confined to the policy role may end up with very 
little to do.  If in reality a competent staff actually prepares the policies, there is little of 
real value for the board members to chew on.  Starved for influence, the board “acts out” 
by meddling in unproductive ways in decision-making areas reserved for staff.  The 
classic case is the board members who takes calls and requests from his own contacts and 
tries to push through grants for his favored organizations.  Staff end up frustrated by their 
thwarted influence in having to administer a grant that they may not agree with.  Our 
research has revealed that organizations that receive their grants this way may end up 
being less responsive to the foundation processes because they have an “inside track.” 16 
 
Another form of meddling is that despite a formal agreement to let staff handle 
grantmaking, board members still spend excessive time going over grants.  The CEO of a 
very large family foundation in the U.S. expressed his frustration: “I think our trustees are 
having a hard time weaning themselves away from grants.  I’ll tell you, the bottom line is 
they love the grants.  They like looking at them.  This is where the rubber meets the road.  
Not only that, we look at all the grants we deny to make sure there isn’t something there 
that we might like.”  The issue here is not one of bad policy about decision-making.  It is 
a matter of inconsistency with expectations for the division of decision-making.  
5. Inquisitorial behavior.  A program officer and trustee of a large private foundation 
described an era in which the board essentially operated as inquisitors (similar to a 
legislative hearing) of the staff each quarter.  The role had evolved into one of, “Let’s see 
if we can catch the staff in mistakes.”  The trustee described this behavior as one way that 
accountability might be demonstrated, and it served to help trustees feel as if they had 
influence, albeit in a twisted way.  But both persons acknowledged that this created 
counter-productive, conservative behavior in the staff.  
 
                                                 
16 Letts, Christine, Ryan, William, “Alignment as Strategy,” forthcoming, 2004.   
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Experts can create confusion in the way they deploy their expertise.  Adele Simmons 
said, “Board members that are politically astute – understand process, what boards do and 
how they do it – are a big help.  A board member can nitpick any project, particularly 
those in fields they know….One might nitpick a project that he actually supported in a 
board meeting, and inadvertently undermine it entirely, not understanding that those are 
conversations one had off-line.”    
 
6. Amateurism.   People may end up on a policy-making board of a foundation without 
regard to their skills or expertise.  The head of a well-respected think tank described his 
experience joining a family foundation board.  After a few meetings, he realized that he 
had inadvertently taken up the role as inquisitor.  He had a lot of knowledge of the policy 
areas in which the staff was doing grantmaking and could engage them with very 
challenging questions.  Because of lack of knowledge and experience, this was work that 
the other board members were not equipped to do, so our think tank leader ended up 
setting up the staff negatively in front of the other board members.  He realized that he 
could be more constructive to the staff by vetting policy proposals before they got to the 
board.  He was surprised to find that his assumption of the conventional model of “board 
makes policy, staff implements” just did not apply in this situation.  The family members 
who were on the board did not fit the real work required of a policy-making board.  The 
staff had the expertise to design and implement the strategies and the board was satisfied 
spending their time approving the resulting grant recommendations.  
 
The problems of amateurism may affect operating foundations more than grantmaking 
ones.  First, trustees are rarely chosen from the same ranks as staff.  Unlike a corporation 
where the top leaders are people who have extensive experience or skills relevant to the 
division they run, trustees who end up as the chief manager of a foundation division may 
have no previous experience in that arena.  They may come to the trustee job as close and 
trusted associates of the founder or board chair.  They may be valuable in creating a 
cohesive decision-making unit or in providing legitimacy, but they may be amateurs 
substantively.  One high-level staff member of a European operating foundation 
described the expertise of several board members as that of “well-informed newspaper 
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readers.”  These board members need to be dedicated to learning and catching up to staff 
and resist the temptation to start new initiatives just to put their own mark on the work.  
The latter problem can be particularly seductive in the absence of clear evaluation that 
helps the organization set priorities based on data.   
 
7. Problems of lifetime roles.  Tenure is another problem that may particularly affect 
operating foundations.  Automatic rotation or term limits may exacerbate the learning 
curve problem above.  Just when a trustee becomes knowledgeable enough to play his 
role effectively, he may be rotated off.  However, longer tenure creates its own set of 
problems.  The ability of a single individual to control the agenda for a part of the 
foundation can become extreme in an operating foundation where a trustee with long 
tenure manages the same division.  To the extent that other trustees abdicate 
responsibility for the “whole” in deference to each managing trustee the absence of 
external accountability coupled with long tenure creates the conditions for abuse.  
 
Informed givers and institutional trustees have different risk profiles. 
Foundation executives and board members are used to talking about taking risks on programs that may not have a clear chance of achieving their 
goals or on organizations that may not reach sustainability.17  If risk means consequences for the decision-maker, claims of risk such as these are 
usually misplaced.  The risk, and consequences of success and failure, is usually held by the grantee, not the foundation.  Indeed, program 
officers may even be rewarded for so-called risks that fail rather than suffer consequences, as board members are fond of saying, “If we don’t 
incur some mistakes and problems, we probably are not doing our job.”  Then what kind of risk do foundations really have?   
 
There seems to be two other ways in which risk affects the behavior of foundation boards and staff.  First, there is the risk of embarrassment, 
either in the eyes of the public or peers.  This could occur by the foundation making bold claims that are never realized or by taking positions on 
policy issues that fail. We actually see far more individuals, such as Ted Turner with his $1 billion gift to the United Nations, take public risks 
such as these rather than institutions.  One foundation leader said, “Individuals take risks, not institutions.”  If we find foundations too timid or 
conservative, it may be due to people in leadership positions who are averse to this kind of exposure.  It may be that the trustee in  his role as 
informed giver (as in the case of the MacArthur Foundation expert) may be more willing to engage more risk than as the institutional trustee.     
  
The second kind of risk is opportunity cost.  If a foundation board makes a “big bet” in which they decide to put a large, disproportionate, amount 
of resources toward one idea, project, or institution, they will forego the opportunity to invest in other things.  The larger the bet, the higher and 
more visible the stakes are for the results.  If the results are bad or inconclusive, the board can be criticized for that opportunity cost, or at least for 
not appropriately hedging their bets.  Stock portfolios that are “balanced” with a variety of stocks are considered less risky.  It would not be 
surprising if this principle were not implicitly used in foundations, because most grantmaking foundations give out many grants in multiple 
subject areas.   
                                                 
17 Risk was the subject of an unpublished paper used by the Executive Session on Philanthropy, Hauser Center, 
2001.   
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The foundation board sets the tone for whether risk is appropriate and will ever be considered.  Without explicit consideration, it is not likely that 
the sum of trustees’ individual inclinations toward risk will result in coherent strategy.  Boards need to understand and deliberate the apparent 
“risk profile” of their portfolios to be clear whether their intentions are being actualized.        
 
Responsibility for Impact – The Accountability Role 
 
The board should determine to whom the foundation is accountable, and for what. 
 
Adele Simmons acknowledges the costs and benefits of the flexibility and relative lack of 
accountability in the following statement:  “The lack of accountability is two-edged.  Because of 
it, foundations can take huge risks.  There is no shareholder looking at the bottom line at the end 
of the quarter.  Lack of accountability can provide great freedom for risk, new ideas, 
experimentation, but it can also be abused.  I am not sure how one balances these two, except 
with basic laws such as we have about self-dealing and transparency.” All foundation board 
members are institutional trustees regardless of additional activities they engage in or roles they 
play.  In addition to establishing what the foundation is to do, the board should establish how the 
foundation should be held accountable.  This includes their decision about how they intend to 
communicate with constituents and how they intend to evaluate the foundation’s work.  There 
are a lot of guidelines about appropriate and respectful communication procedures.  Remaining 
private will become increasingly difficult.  Evaluation may be considered across the other five 
arenas of decisions, from mission to grantee relations.  The board should familiarize itself with 
the growing literature on foundation evaluation and decide what kind and how much to do.  
Boards are more likely to be held irresponsible for the failure to consider accountability and 
evaluation rather than choosing the wrong type.  As discussed earlier, accountability is not 
synonymous with transparency or publicity.  A board can install excellent, but private, processes 
to hold themselves accountable and to measure results.  Indeed, no amo unt of public scrutiny 
will substitute for integrity among a foundation’s leadership.     
 
Operating foundations face particular challenges in accountability. Operating foundation trustees 
could adopt the image of feudal lords who have the ability to dispense resources without regard 
to impact or performance. If the board divides responsibility for operating divisions among the 
members, many of the hazards discussed thus far are present, such as lack of accountability or 
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evaluation due to deference.  Operating foundation boards that adopt the traditional corporate 
structure are essentially putting themselves in the policy-making role explained above, but are 
also responsible for overseeing managers who are expected to produce certain results directly, 
some of which are very difficult to evaluate.   
 
There are some types of programs in operating foundations that are easy to evaluate.  This is the 
case with real estate operations that can measure return, artistic companies or museums that are 
subject to critics, or farms that can measure their output.  However, in social service areas, 
evaluation may even be more challenging than it is for grantmaking foundations.  Many boards 
are dissatisfied with measuring activities or outputs, but determining outcomes is expensive and 
elusive.  It is difficult to get objective and honest feedback from partners or communities that 
benefit from the foundation’s activities.  These phenomena make it difficult for governing boards 
to be sure that they are fulfilling their responsibility.  This may be why many revert to managing 
roles in which they are able to exercise their influence more directly.   
 
Further, formal outcome evaluations may be ill suited to the needs of an operating foundation 
that is inclined to revise its approach as conditions change.  A staff manager explained:  “We 
should be aware of the fact that carefully done evaluation may well be quite critical of board 
decisions and board suggestions.  At least from the experience of our own foundation, this is a 
notion that can be a challenge to the entrepreneurial freedom of a board and of a chairman.  
When our chairman discovered that a systematic approach to evaluation could also put limits or 
judgments on his own discretion, this was a clear challenge to the decision-making authority of 
the board.  It turned out that the board chose a rather entrepreneurial option, saying…we take 
entrepreneurial action and work for accountable and responsible management on an ongoing 
level.”  
 
Public foundations, such as community foundations, and foundations formed through some 
process of public rule, such as the health conversion foundations in the U.S. and the bank 
conversion institutions in Italy, usually have a unique set of governance role clarity and 
accountability challenges.  Most community foundations have charters that allow different 
elected bodies or individuals to appoint trustees.  They frequently have term limits.  The 
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combination of these two phenomena can cause up to 50% turnover in trustees in some 
institutions over just a few years.  This turnover creates several problems.  First, it increases the 
problem of amateurism.  Trustees may end up on the board due to political connections, prestige 
in the community or as executives-in-training.  None of these attributes equips the individuals for 
philanthropy or even community involvement, nor do they necessarily equip the individuals to 
relate to each other as a group.  Second, it increases the institution’s reliance on the staff.  The 
staff maintains the continuity and the trustees must rely on the staff for most of the information.  
With this lesser opportunity for influence, and disparate community connections, the temptation 
to meddle is great.  
 
Many foundations in Europe have a state representative by law.  Such is the case with the Italian 
Bank foundations established in the mid-1990s.  These individuals could be appropriate agents of 
accountability, but for what?  Lack of clarity in public foundations revolves around mission and 
the role of trustees.  How much freedom should the trustees have to craft the mission?  How 
much should the community be able to contribute to this decision?  Are the trustees 
representatives of their respective whole (like the U.S. Senate)? The charters of the foundation 
rarely answer these questions, which are frequently the subject of an “invisible deal,” which can 
evolve and change over time.  Disparate accountability and lack of mission clarity rarely result in 
harm.  However, there may be enormous opportunity lost, as these groups of odd fellows agree 
on many small, nice grants, but may not be able to agree on initiatives that have the chance to 
change community conditions.  
 
Even foundations that do not have official public charters can end up with public expectations 
that can overwhelm the foundation’s flexibility and ability to be independent.  The Gulbenkian 
Foundation of Lisbon, Portugal, by far the largest foundation in the country, attempted to transfer 
the orchestra that it operated to the state.  There was public outcry, because the community 
believed that the state would not be able to maintain the quality that the company had developed 
under foundation management.  Under this pressure, the trustees decided to keep the orchestra.  
Freiberg Stiftungverwaltung, a four hundred year old foundation in the southern part of 
Germany, faced a decision on whether to make up a large public revenue cut to local theaters that 
the town had to make. The fact that the mayor of the town is the chairman of the board certainly 
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complicated this decision.  It is possible that the Italian bank foundations will end up with 
pressure to support public programs because of the connection to the state.   
 
Foundations in the United States end up with similar public expectations and pressures.  With the 
increasing mobility of generations of family, communities claim to be “abandoned” by family 
foundations that may have been an important contributor to the town through the years, but 
whose board now contains children who do not live there and have strong interests elsewhere.  
The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, in Kansas City, Missouri came under public scrutiny 
because of plans to phase out grants to community groups that had regular funding from the 
foundation.18  The resignation of three board members over this added fuel to the controversy. 
 
Boards that listen to the advocates who encourage them to be accountable through 
communication and transparency will potentially face the public scrutiny and pressures similar to 
those faced in the examples above.   It is no wonder that many boards choose the maximum 
anonymity that the law allows and that annual reports end up as public relations tools rather than 
detailed explanations of intentions and results.   
 
It is easy to dodge the responsibility for impact question with assumptions about the quality of 
staff and process.  The board should explicitly decide to whom they are accountable, and for 
what.  They then need to decide how they will check on whether they are fulfilling their 
aspirations.   
 
Once roles are set, the board should establish periodic reviews to assure that the set of policies 
and practices as implemented meet their intent and expectations.   
 
Boards need to assure themselves that processes are accomplishing their intended purpose. Are 
the processes living up to individuals’ (both staff and board) expectations?  More important, are 
the policies and practices aligned with each other?  The arenas in which foundations work are 
dynamic.  Establishing a regular time and process to check in on this question sets the board up 
to be adaptive to the changing needs of the environment and staff and board individuals.  Recent 
                                                 
18 Anft, Michael, “Kauffman Board Members Resigns…,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, September 18, 2003, p. 11. 
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studies of grantmaking strategies and nonprofit board practices support the idea of emergent 
strategy, regularly informed by staff (or board members) that is in the field, closest to the 
action.19  
 
As foundations grow and evolve, the board responsibilities will change.  Family foundations 
“grow up” into independent institutions.  A living donor will decide to dramatically change his 
involvement.  A long-time CEO will finally leave.  A community crisis forces a foundation to 
change its strategy abruptly.  Tension will inevitably result if the organization does not recognize 
inevitable evolution and the board processes and structure do not adapt to the changing needs of 
the community, organization and staff.   
 
 
 
Summary 
 
The foundation field is appropriately beginning to focus on the behavior and processes of 
foundation boards.  There is a growing body of literature that offers advice on structures and 
procedures to ensure that boards are meeting their stewardship responsibilities.  However, 
achieving foundation board effectiveness is complex and entails more than this literature 
suggests.  The nature of philanthropy  – generosity – and the flexibility that is a feature of 
foundation structure demand that we consider as legitimate many more roles than are typically 
considered in the literature.   By focusing on roles, we will improve the work of foundation 
boards and their results.    
 
                                                 
19 Letts, et al. op cit., p.  22     
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APPENDIX 1 
ACHIEVING CLARITY, INFLUENCE AND IMPACT: 
GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR FOUNDATION BOARDS 
 
These questions are intended to help a foundation board achieve clarity of roles, appropriate 
influence in decision-making and improve the foundation’s potential for impact.  The questions 
do not necessarily have right or wrong answers, but are helpful as a basis for discussion.  
 
I.  General (These items might be documented in a board orientation book.) 
· What are the legal requirements of the foundation? 
· What are the legal responsibilities of the board members? 
· What are the requirements of the trust or by-laws?   
· What processes are in place to help the board fulfill the legal and trust 
requirements?  How much time is required, of whom?   
· What staff or resources are available to assist the board?   
· What is the compensation for board members (time and expenses)?  Does this 
meet legal or industry guidelines?  
· What are the standard processes (meetings, reports, procedures) in which board 
members are expected to participate?  Where?   
· What is the estimated total time commitment per year for a board member?  
· What are the terms limits and nomination processes for board members?    
 
II. Clarity on Roles        
    A.  Boards with Staff 
· What is the board’s group role in the following decision-making areas? 
 Mission development and review   
   Strategy for Impact; Overall budget 
   Organizational structure and culture 
   Grantmaking strategy; grant processes 
   Grantee Relations 
   Evaluation 
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  Examples of roles: 
   Creation  
   Approval – voting required 
   Advisory – notification/review/comment 
   Information only 
   None 
· What role do individuals on the board have, if different than the group role?  
Why? 
· What processes (committees, meetings, reports, procedures) are in place to allow 
the members to fulfill their responsibilities?   
· What staff support or resources are available to assist the board members?   
· What is the respective staff role (who, what, when) in each of the above decision-
making areas?   
   B.  Boards as Staff 
· What role does the board as a group have in the above decision-making areas?   
· What is the division of responsibility among the board members for the work 
associated with the decision-making areas above?   
· What processes are there to help the board members fulfill their responsibilities 
(meetings, reports, procedures)?   
· What administrative support or resources are available to help board members? 
· What is the expected time commitment for each board member?    
 
III. Influence  (Questions for individual board members)  
   A.  Expertise/Relationships 
· Why were you asked to join the foundation board?   
· Is there a particular knowledge base/skill/relationship base that you think is 
relevant to the work?  That you have been asked to use?  
· Do you feel equipped for the role and decisions that are expected of you?   
 
   B.  Preferences 
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· What do you enjoy most about your foundation work?  Why? 
· What work or activities do you consider most important?  Why?   
· What work would you suggest dropping from your responsibilities?  Why? 
· What work do you think you should do more of?  Why?  
 
   C.  Time/Resources 
Estimate the amount of time you spend in the various roles and activities as a board 
member…. 
· Is this about right?  Too little?  Too much?  Why?   
· Are the resources adequate to help you be effective?  If not, what do you need?   
 
IV. Accountability for Impact (These are programmatic rather than legal in nature.) 
· Who are the stakeholders of the foundation?   
   Living donors 
   Family 
   Community 
   Grantees 
   Employees 
   Politicians 
   Media 
   Public at large  
   Other? 
· What accountability does the foundation have to each of these? 
· How does/will the foundation fulfill this accountability?   
· What collective or individual responsibility does the board have to achieve this 
accountability?   
· What processes have been established to fulfill the accountability goals or 
requirements?   
· What time commitment is expected of board members for these activities?     
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APPENDIX 2 
 
A Review of Foundation Board Training Literature 
 
2004 Melissa Wickman 
 
 
When a man assumes a public trust, he should consider himself a public property. 
~ Thomas Jefferson 
 
 
This above quote from Thomas Jefferson serves as a reminder for those who assume roles 
of public service.  Society expects such individuals to act responsibly and make decisions for the 
greater good.  Yet one may also interpret the quote as a warning.  Those who take on the public’s 
trust are often held to a higher standard and can experience tremendous scrutiny during their 
tenures.  Elected officials, teachers, peace officers, even board members of nonprofit 
organizations are potential targets for public inquiry.  Therefore, it should come as no surprise 
that board members of foundations also endure such examinations.  For example, the Boston 
Globe recently ran a series of articles that focused on questionable behavior exhibited by some 
board members of local foundations.20  The articles typically highlight excessive perks and 
questionable grantmaking practices.   
There are serious ramifications each time a board member abuses the power granted 
through their position.  Not only are there fewer dollars available for worthy charitable 
organizations, but the general public loses faith in the philanthropic community.  Foundations are 
no longer considered immune to the scandals that are typically attributed to the private sector.  
Yet popular media and law enforcement continue to focus on stricter federal regulations as a 
means of prevention.  It is rare to see a call for increased education and training for foundation 
board members.  Even if foundation leaders heeded such advice, it is unclear where they should 
turn for literature and training materials. 
Although some may believe that directors should know better, there are no legal 
requirements that directors must receive training in order to serve.  A few organizations provide 
training for foundation board members, most notably Board Source and the Council on 
                                                 
20 Healy, Beth et al, Boston Globe, 2003 
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Foundations. 21  The Council on Foundations publishes Foundation News & Commentary, which 
occasionally prints columns and articles that address specific foundation board issues.  Finally, 
the Foundation Center web site has a topical resource list that offers annotated bibliographies of 
books on nonprofit boards.22   
I recently embarked on what I thought would be a simple assignment – creating an 
annotated bibliography of written materials focusing on foundation board development.  I 
discovered plenty of materials that addressed issues concerning boards of directors for charitable 
organizations.  There are also books for boards of large foundations that manage universities and 
hospitals.  Even books and articles written for family foundations include sections addressing 
their boards.  However, my search for writings that specifically address the unique 
responsibilities required of grantmaking boards generated few results.  Many of the publications 
are more than ten years old.  Most of the books and articles emphasize structural 
recommendations for foundation boards.  Such questions are most helpful for newer foundations.  
For example: What is the size of an ideal board?  How should boards run meetings?  How long 
should someone serve on a board? 
However, models for good foundation governance do exist.  One such example is a slim 
tome titled Trustees and the Future of Foundations.  Written by John W. Nason and published in 
1977, the book provides one of the few comprehensive looks at the roles and responsibilities of 
foundation trustees.23  Although the statistics in his first book are outdated (he refers to 26,000 
foundations with combined total assets of approximately $31.5 billion) his recommendations 
remain valid today.24   
Nason does an excellent job of summarizing his main points in the final chapter where he 
lists the following nine responsibilities of foundation trustees: 1) recognize that they serve a 
public trust, 2) plan a program or programs of philanthropy, 3) make hard choices among public 
needs, 4) diversify board membership and broaden outlook, 5) plan for continuity and renewal of 
board, 6) organize for effective operation, 7) make the foundation accessible, 8) be familiar with 
                                                 
21 Board Source is a nonprofit organization that offers a variety consulting and training services for nonprofit boards.  
Board Source also has a large collection of written materials for purchase. 
22 Foundation Center.  http://www.fdncenter.com 
23 John Nason was the former president of Swarthmore and Carleton Colleges and served as a trustee for the Council 
on Foundations. 
24 The most recent survey (2001) conducted by the Foundation Center identified more than 61,000 foundations with 
assets totaling almost $477 billion.  <http://fdncenter.org/fc_stats/pdf/02_found_growth/04_01.pdf> February 8, 
2004. 
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and to fulfill all legal requirements, and 9) give public accounting of activities.25  Nason revisits 
his recommendations in a subsequent analysis printed in 1989.  This version, titled Foundation 
trusteeship: service in the public interest, is still available in print. 
Yet much has changed since Nason’s last publication, such as the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and renewed interest in foundation accountability and transparency.  The 
philanthropic field requires a fresh and comprehensive look at the role of board members in 
foundations.  Until then, foundation leaders will be required to navigate through the fragmented 
body of literature that covers foundation boards. 
The following annotated bibliography is meant to serve as a guide for those who wish to 
strengthen their organizations by having informed board members.  The list brings together 
articles, books and tools available for use by foundation boards.  While some are readily 
available from publishers, others may be out of print and can be obtained through some 
university collections or via the Foundation Center Library in New York City.  
 
                                                 
25 Nason, John W.;  Goheen, Robert F.;  Council on Foundations. Trustees and the future of foundations. 
Washington, DC: Council on Foundations. 1977. 
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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abstracts provided by The Foundation Center26 except where noted.  All of these resources can 
by found at The Foundation Center library in New York and have limited availability at other 
Foundation Center resource centers.  Books are also available directly from the publishers (e.g. 
Council on Foundations) and some national retail book stores. 
 
General Resources 
 
Carson, Emmett D. "Worst-case scenario or the perfect storm?". Foundation News & 
Commentary vol. 45 (January-February 2004) p. 18-22.  
The author catalogs various recent challenges to foundation boards and recommends strategies 
for dealing with them. 
 
Cuninggim, Merrimon;  Council on Foundations. Letters to a foundation trustee : what we 
need to know about foundations and their management. Washington, DC: Council on 
Foundations. 1991. vi, 28 p.  
Paper written in the format of a series of letters to a friend who is about to join a foundation 
board.  Discusses the roles and responsibilities of foundation trustees, including grantmaking, 
relationships with other foundations, personnel policies, and accountability. 
 
Foundation Governance: The CEO Viewpoint.  The Center for Effective Philanthropy. 2003 
 
Houle, Cyril O. The effective board. 1960. Reprint. New York, NY: Association Press. 
[1980]. 174 p.  
 
Nason, John W.;  Goheen, Robert F.;  Council on Foundations. Trustees and the future of 
foundations. Washington, DC: Council on Foundations. 1977. 112 p.  
Analysis of the role of foundation trustees in today's society, covering such topics as public 
accountability, professional staffs, and the 1969 Tax Reform Act. He concludes that foundations 
are in danger of being torn apart between two opposing views of what is best for American 
society, and that foundation trustees are crucial to preventing their institutions from being 
destroyed.  Includes brief bibliography. 
 
Nason, John W.;  Foundation Center. Foundation trusteeship : service in the public interest. 
New York, NY: Foundation Center. 1989. xi, 173 p.  
Nason provides a major reassessment of the responsibilities of foundation trustees. Examines the 
present state of the foundation universe, the importance of foundations to American society, why 
foundation performance is falling short of its full potential, and how today's trustees can face the 
challenges before them to help improve foundation performance. Discusses the modern 
foundation's dual nature (as privately organized public institutions), the complexities involved in 
developing programs for a changing society, the three routes to board membership, qualities of a 
good trustee, the dynamics of an effective board, the advantages and disadvantages of staffing, 
the respective roles and obligations of board and staff in foundation management, and the 
                                                 
26 Copyright © 2004, The Foundation Center. All rights reserved. <http://lnps.fdncenter.org/dbtw-
wpd/exec/dbtwpub.dll.>  July 25, 2004. 
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question of compensation. The study also investigates the issue of full disclosure, and examines 
the effect of the new tax laws upon foundations. Bibliography. 
 
Prager, Denis J. Organizing Foundations for Maximum Impact: A Guide to Effective 
Philanthropy. Colorado. The Aspen Institute, 2003. 
 
Wood, Miriam M.;  Leaman, E. Lewis. Governing board oversight of donor dollars : the 
Foundation for New Era Philanthropy. New Haven, CT: Institution for Social and Policy 
Studies. 1996. 17 p. 
 
Young, Donald R.;  Moore, Wilbert E. Trusteeship and the management of foundations. 
New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 1969. viii, 158 p. 
 
Zurcher, Arnold. Management of American foundations : administration, policies, and social 
role. New York, NY: New York University Press. 1972. vii, 184 p.  
 
Zwingle, J.L. Effective trusteeship : guidelines for board members. Washington, DC: 
Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. 1975. 39 p. 
 
 
Board Compensation 
 
Allen, Kent. "Conflicted over compensation". Foundation News & Commentary vol. 42 
(January-February 2001) p. 25-7.  
More than three-quarters of the foundations that responded to a Council on Foundations survey 
on trustee compensation indicated that they do not offer payment of any kind. Yet there are 
notable exceptions, and the topic is controversial. The W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Duke 
Endowment, and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation are some that do pay trustees. 
Several notable leaders of the field offer their opinions about the pros and cons. 
 
Draper, Lee. "A dubious legacy". Foundation News & Commentary vol. 42 (March-April 
2001) p. 22-5.  
Should foundations pay their board members? This author presents his arguments against the 
practice, responding to an article by Kent Allen in the January-February 2001 issue of the same 
magazine. 
 
Williamson, Richard. "Charitable funds going to least in need--foundation board 
members". NonProfit Times Financial Management Edition vol. 17 (15 December 2003) p. 
1, 12-3.  
Describes examples of foundations that may be paying their board members excessively. Cites 
data from "Foundation Trustee Fees: Use and Abuse," published by The Center for Public and 
Nonprofit Leadership, Georgetown Public Policy Institute. Sidebar includes brief article "What is 
a 'reasonable' fee for a foundation trustee?" 
 
 
Conflicts of Interest & Controversy 
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Anft, Michael. "State clears Kauffman Fund of wrongdoing". Chronicle of Philanthropy 
vol. 16 (18 March 2004) p. 34.  
Attorney General Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri has cleared the Ewing Marion Kauffman 
Foundation of any illegal activities and conflicts of interest. Kansas City nonprofits had 
previously argued that the foundation under chief executive Carl J. Shramm was withdrawing 
support for Kansas City causes, questioning his interpretation of instructions left by founder 
Ewing Marion Kauffman. Former trustees had also accused the foundation of offering a job to an 
outgoing trustee, Brian O' Connell, shortly before voting whether to retain Shramm as chief 
executive. The Attorney General has suggest that the foundation review and clarify its policies to 
avoid similar conflicts in the future. 
 
Bailey, Anne Lowrey;  Goss, Kristin A. "Confidential review of Marin Foundation said to 
call for sweeping changes". Chronicle of Philanthropy vol. 3 (16 October 1990) p. 19.  
The "Marin Independent Journal" obtained and published a confidential review of the Marin 
Community Foundation's operation, which the trustees voted in June not to release. The review 
finds that unless the present structure of the board of trustees is changed, it "will prevent 
successful management of the foundation." It also criticizes the board for being too involved in 
the foundation's daily operations, rather than fulfilling its role as a policy-making body. 
 
Bailey, Anne Lowrey. "Turmoil at Gannett". Chronicle of Philanthropy vol. 2 (24 July 
1990) p. 1, 14-5.  
Examines concerns that Gannett Foundation officials are spending too much money on expenses 
since Allen H. Neuharth retired as chairman of the Gannett Company in March of 1989 and 
began to devote more attention to his position as the foundation's chairman. 
 
Casey, Constance. "A donor's messy legacy". Chronicle of Philanthropy vol. 12 (23 March 
2000) p. 9-10, 12.  
Discusses controversy regarding the disposal of multimillionaire Howard Gilman's estate since 
his death two years ago, and concerns regarding the executors of his estate being board members 
of the Howard Gilman Foundation. 
 
Cohen, Rick. "Time to stop excusing the inexcusable : foundation trustees who play by 
their own rules". Nonprofit Quarterly vol. 10 (Winter 2003) p. 44-50. 
Cohen, executive director of the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, decries the 
practice of fees, self-dealing, self-granting and other controversies on the part of foundation 
boards. 
 
"One man uses a loophole to take control of foundation". Board Member vol. 9 (March 
2000) p. 2-3.  
Discusses the way in which William Wachenfeld used his position as a lifetime corporation 
member of the Hayden Foundation to dominate the organization and intimidate board members 
through his power to appoint or dismiss board members at will. 
 
Rocque, Amanda. "Funds urged to appraise charity boards' quality". Chronicle of 
Philanthropy vol. 7 (29 November 1994) p. 30. 
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Donor Intent 
 
Bork, Robert H. "Interpreting the founder's vision". Philanthropy vol. 7 (Winter 1993) p. 
1-3, 26.  
Text of the keynote address of the Philanthropy Roundtable annual meeting, held October 29-30, 
1993, in Colorado Springs. Judge Bork addressed the parallels between Constitutional 
interpretation and the interpretation of donors' intentions. 
 
Brody, Deborah. "The past is prologue". Foundation News vol. 32 (November-December 
1991) p. 39-41.  
Advocates the use of oral histories to help preserve the vision of foundation funders and to help 
illuminate interrelationships between people and ideas within foundations. Discusses oral history 
as an academic discipline; provides advice on the planning and conducting of an oral history; and 
presents examples of foundations that have undertaken oral histories, with a focus on the Spencer 
Foundation. 
 
 
Foundation Specific – Community Foundations 
 
"Continuity in the family foundation". Family Business Review vol. 3 (Winter 1990) p. 405-
20.  
Provides five authors' descriptions of innovative programs developed in various family 
foundations to deal with the challenges of recruiting, selecting and training new generations of 
board members.  
 
The guide for community foundation board members. Washington, DC: BoardSource. 2003. 
75 p.  
Explains the structure and responsibilities of the board, with recommendations for effective 
practices. Appendix I reprints the National Standards for U. S. Community Foundations. 
Includes glossary and resource lists. 
 
National Agenda for Community Foundations. National Training Project;  Council on 
Foundations. Community foundation competency guide : self-assessment and action plan for 
professional development . Washington, DC: Council on Foundations. 1988. iv, 37 p. Basic 
workbook to help board members, chief executive officers and staff members of community 
foundations set personal and professional learning goals. Competencies are identified in the areas 
of mission and history, governance, resource development, management, grantmaking and 
community leadership, and communications and public relations. The workbook is 
complemented by the Council on Foundations' "Community Foundation Resource Guide", which 
identifies resources supporting the development of the above competencies. 
 
National Agenda for Community Foundations. National Training Project;  Council on 
Foundations. Governance. Washington, DC: Council on Foundations. 1990. viii, 50 p.  
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Derived from the "Community Foundation Competency Guide", this manual examines legal and 
practical aspects involved in governing a community foundation. Details the legal parameters of 
the governing body; offers suggestions for educating the board about its responsibilities; 
discusses board composition, selection and structure; and examines the board's planning, 
administrative, fiduciary and ethical responsibilities. 
 
National Agenda for Community Foundations. National Training Project;  Council on 
Foundations. What's my role? A conversation with community foundation board members. 
[video recording]. Washington, DC: Council on Foundations. 1990.  
Abstract: Organized into six topic as presented in the "Community Foundation Competency 
Guide", this film brings together five community foundation board members to express their 
views on topics dealing with mission and history, governance, management, resource 
development, grantmaking and community leadership, and communications and public relations. 
 
Self-study guide for community foundation boards. Washington, DC: Council on 
Foundations. 1986. 16 p. 
 
 
Foundation Specific - Corporate 
 
Regelbrugge, Laurie. Making the most of corporate foundation boards : strategies and 
practices. Washington, DC: Council on Foundations. 2001. x, 104 p.  
Published with the National Center for Nonprofit Boards (now BoardSource), this book provides 
various models showing the responsibilities of corporate foundation boards, typical composition 
of the board, legal issues that board members will want to understand, board orientation, 
establishing meeting protocols, and the interaction between board and staff, among other topics. 
Appendices include sample by-laws and a bibliography. 
 
 
Foundation Specific - Independent 
 
Self-study guide for independent foundation boards. [2nd ed.] Washington, DC: Council on 
Foundations. 1994. 22 p.  
Handbook designed to enhance the governance abilities and practices of independent 
foundations, using a questionnaire format. Sections cover mission; program interests; board 
membership, organization, management, and operations; grantmaking; fiduciary responsibilities; 
and general and individual assessment. Includes user guide. 
 
 
Foundation Specific - Family 
 
Coy, Cissie. "Always in the family?". Foundation News vol. 32 (January-February 1991) p. 
52-4.  
Examines the various compositions of family foundation boards. While some family foundations 
prefer that all trustees be family members, others find that a few outside voices can enrich the 
process. A family-only board works best when family members have the time and interest to 
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direct the foundation. The seven trustees of the Albert Kunstadter Family Foundation in New 
York City are all family members who personally supervise annual grantmaking of about 
$285,000. The Kunstadter board has two main advantages: 1) it can maintain close relations with 
grantees, and 2) it can respond quickly to requests. Family-only boards are well suited to 
foundations with finely focused grantmaking interests. The Bert and Mary Meyer Foundation in 
Orlando, Fla. has a two-tier board that allows for community representation while maintaining 
family control of the organization. Meyer's two-tier board is comprised of three white family 
members and two blacks, one American Indian, and a Salvadoran. Women make up the majority 
of the board. The seven board members make policy and grantmaking decisions, but the three 
family members elect the board and amend the articles and bylaws. Outsiders are also limited to 
one-year terms. Paul Ylvisaker finds two strong arguments for bringing outsiders onto the board: 
1) diversity, and 2) the ability to rise above family concerns. Some family foundations find that 
giving some authority to advisory committees is a good way to strengthen diversity. 
 
 
Geographic Specific 
 
Chernoff, David S. Duties and responsibilities of directors and trustees of Illinois private 
foundations. Chicago, IL: Donors Forum of Chicago. 1997. vii, 35 p. 
 
Amighetti, Leopold. "Responsibilities and liabilities of foundation directors and trustees". 
Philanthropist/Le Philanthrope vol. 13 (Number 1) 1996 p. 3-28. 
Recommendations for board members in Canada. 
 
 
Legal & Financial 
 
Craig, John E., Jr. "Governance issues affecting foundation investing". Philanthropy vol. 9 
(Spring 1995) p. 14-7, 29. 
 
Edie, John A.;  Smith, Lowell S. "Investing in U.S. securities is a violation of your fiduciary 
duty". Foundation News vol. 34 (November-December 1993) p. 24-30.  
Reports on new developments in law, modern investment theory, and current research on 
foundation investments, that have refined the notion of fiduciary duty. First of a two-part series. 
 
Edie, John A.;  Smith, Lowell S. "Let go of your old investment assumptions". Foundation 
News vol. 35 (January-February 1994) p. 34-9.  
Provides recommendations on new ways foundation governing boards can preserve endowment 
using modern portfolio management. Second of a two-part series. 
 
Flather, Newell; Maksy, Pamela Labonte. "This Is Your Final Notice." Foundation News & 
Commentary, vol. 44 (July-August 2003): p. 30-4.  
Fiduciary oversight is a primary responsibility of foundation trustees. This article provides 
practical advice to foundation board members on safeguarding the funder, and four case studies 
illustrate potential pitfalls. 
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Tools 
 
Boardsmanship [video recording]. Washington, DC: Council on Foundations. 1999. 50:00 
minutes.  
Workbook and videotape. 
 
Calhoun, Susan. "A helpful look inward". Foundation News vol. 28 (January-February 
1987) p. 63-4.  
Description of a self-study program developed by the Association of Governing Boards of 
Colleges and Universities for their trustees and rewritten for use by foundation trustees. The 
program enables foundation trustees to evaluate and improve their performance. The self-study 
guide is available in three versions tailored to family, non-family and community foundations. 
The project is overseen by the Council on Foundations' Director of Information, Carol Hooper. 
 
Clohesy, Stephanie (ed.);  Di Leonardi, Rob (ed.);  Fierman, Kim (ed.) Foundation in a box. 
Bethesda, MD: Association of Small Foundations. 2003. 6 vols.  
Composed of six volumes: Volume 1: Introduction; Volume 2: Boards; Volume 3: Investments; 
Volume 4: Tax & Legal; Volume 5: Grantmaking; and Volume 6: Administration. Various 
specialists have contributed chapters to the set. 
 
Council on Foundations (comp.) Trustee orientation packet. Unpublished. [1988]. 1 v. 
(various pagings). 
 
Council on Foundations (comp.) Trustee orientation resource. Washington, DC: Council on 
Foundations. 1993. i, 108 p. 
 
Draper, Lee. "Don't make a 'hasty retreat'". Foundation News & Commentary vol. 42 
(January-February 2001) p. 32-6.  
Explains the advantages of a board retreat, and how to organize the event effectively. A 
sideboard provides the experience and recommendations from the Flintridge Foundation, a 
family foundation in Pasadena, CA. 
 
Edie, John A.;  Council on Foundations. Directors and officers liability insurance and 
indemnification : an explanation for foundations. [Rev. ed.] Washington, DC: Council on 
Foundations. 1993. ii, 37 p.  
Arranged in a question and answer format, this booklet provides information on indemnification 
and directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance. Also addresses the correct tax treatment of 
insurance premiums and discusses the main features of the Chubb Group's D&O liability 
insurance program, which has been endorsed by the Council on Foundations. 
 
Mintz, Joshua;  Cavanaugh, Denise;  Pierson, Jane. Self-assessment for foundation boards 
: user's guide and questionnaire. Washington, DC: National Center for Nonprofit Boards. 
2000. 66 p. 
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Strauch, Carol. "Getting oriented". Foundation News vol. 31 (September-October 1990) p. 
28-33.  
Examines the importance of orienting new trustees if foundations want to have effective boards. 
Certain roles and responsibilities, essential facts about the foundation, and the cultural norms of 
the organization need to be imparted to new board members. Includes a list of information which 
is worth including in a board handbook, and selected resources on board training. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OTHER 
 
General Resources 
 
Lipton, David A.;  Virginia Law Review. Significant private foundations and the need for 
public selection of their trustees. Reprint. Charlottesville, VA: Virginia Law Review 
Association. 1978. 54 p. 
 
Diversity 
 
Bryson, Ellen;  Parsons, Steve. What foundation boards are saying about diversity. 
Washington, DC: Council on Foundations. 2003. 13 p. 
 
Profiles & Case Studies 
 
Osborn, Torie;  Ramirez, Margarita. "Grantmaking from the grassroots". Foundation 
News & Commentary vol. 43 (May-June 2002) p. 41-2.  
A case study focusing on the Liberty Hill Foundation, whose board is primarily community 
activists. 
 
Williams, Roger M. "Spreading the net". Foundation News vol. 32 (November-December 
1991) p. 31-3.  
Profiles Wisconsin's Community Foundation for the Fox Valley Region. The foundation's 
organizers ran an advertisement in the newspaper to find their forty-eight member board of 
directors. 
 
Reports 
 
Billitteri, Thomas J. "Foundation investment and governance policies detailed in new 
report". Chronicle of Philanthropy vol. 11 (11 March 1999) p. 36-7.  
Summarizes the new report "Foundation Management Series", 9th edition, published by the 
Council on Foundations. The report is detailed in a four-volume series and is based on a 1997 
survey of 673 foundations. It contains information about foundation investment practices, board 
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composition and compensation policies, finances and management, and benefits and personnel 
policies. 
 
Foundation governance : the CEO viewpoint. Cambridge, MA: Center for Effective 
Philanthropy. 2004. 19 p.  
This publication provides the results of a survey of CEOs of the largest 250 foundations in the U. 
S., specifically delving into the CEO-board relationship. Among the findings: about half the 
trustees receive compensation for their board service. 
 
Moore, Jennifer. "White men still dominate foundation boards". Chronicle of Philanthropy 
vol. 5 (23 February 1993) p. 47, 50-1.  
Reports on the findings in the Council on Foundation's "Foundation Management Report", 7th 
edition. 
 
Trustee connection : the middle tier. Washington, DC: Women & Philanthropy. [2000?]. 20 
p.  
Data was collected from a survey of corporate, community, and independent foundations to 
determine the diversity--as well as disabilities and sexual preference--among their board 
members. Compilation of data was followed-up with trustee interviews. Results are presented in 
tabular and narrative form. 
 
Women & Boards 
 
Bonavoglia, Angela. The trustee connection : making a difference. New York, NY: Women 
and Foundations/Corporate Philanthropy. 1994. 36 p.  
Presents a detailed account of women foundation trustees, based on in-depth personal interviews 
with seventeen women trustees of various foundations representing different regions, ages, 
backgrounds, races, classes, ethnicities, and types of foundations. Provides insight into the 
workings and thinkings of a seldom-studied but highly influential group.  With bibliography and 
resource list. 
 
Goss, Kristin A.;  Women and Foundations/Corporate Philanthropy. "Study finds twenty 
percent of the trustees of large foundations are women, fourteen percent are members of 
minority groups". Chronicle of Philanthropy vol. 2 (3 April 1990) p. 1, 16-7.  
Reviews a Women and Foundations/Corporate Philanthropy study of seventy-five major 
foundation boards.  Includes tables showing the names of all foundations in each of the three 
groups, along with number of total trustees, number and percent of women and minority trustees, 
and ranking. 
 
Greene, Stephen G. "Women gain on foundation staff but not on boards". Chronicle of 
Philanthropy vol. 2 (4 September 1990) p. 25, 28.  
According to this Council on Foundations management study, compiled from data supplied by 
723 foundations, there has been an increase of women employed as professionals on the staff of 
U.S. foundations, but not on their boards of directors. Includes information on salaries by 
geographic area and type and size of foundation. Other data included in this study: administrative 
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expenses in managing the grantmaking activities of foundations; types of investments made by 
foundations of various sizes; and yearly wages of boards of directors by size of foundations. 
 
Teltsch, Kathleen;  Joseph, James A.;  Council on Foundations. "At foundations, the voice 
of women and minorities remains faint. New York Times (7 April 1990)  
Examines the issue of racial, ethnic and sexual diversity among the boards of American 
foundations. 
 
Women and Foundations/Corporate Philanthropy. Far from done : the challenge of 
diversifying philanthropic leadership. New York, NY: Women and Foundations/Corporate 
Philanthropy. 1990. 25 p.  
Part of a long-term effort by Women and Foundations/Corporate Foundations to encourage 
diversity within philanthropy, this report examines the diversity of foundation board composition 
by race and gender.  Report includes an interview with Jean Fairfax (Chair of the Advisory 
Committee to the Council on Foundation's Pluralism in Philanthropy Project) about diversifying 
foundation boards, a discussion of the token representation of women on foundation boards, an 
article on reactions to the survey data on foundation board composition, and case studies on 
diversifying foundation boards. 
 
 
